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Nationstar Mortg. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 34 (June 22, 2017)1
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRANSACTIONS: STANDING, SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Summary
The Court held that a servicer of a loan that is owned by a regulated entity does have
standing to raise claims on behalf of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. If a party argues that
federal law preempts state law when a case is properly before the court, then the court has authority
to determine that issue.
Background
SFR bought a property through foreclosure proceedings. After the original purchaser of the
home filed suit against SFR, SFR filed a third-party complaint against Nationstar. This was a quiet
title claim. The original purchaser’s suit was dismissed for other reasons. The remaining parties
both moved for summary judgment. SFR argued that Nationstar’s security interest was
extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Nationstar argued that its interest still exists because Freddie
Mac purchased the loan that was taken out by the original purchaser, Freddie Mac was under
conservatorship by the FHFA, and the Federal Foreclosure Bar prohibits the property sale without
FHFA’s consent. Nationstar also argued that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS
116.3116.2 The district court granted SFR’s summary judgment motion. It held that there was a
factual dispute as to whether Freddie Mac or the FHFA had an interest in the deed, but Nationstar
lacked standing to bring any claims on FHFA’s behalf. The district court did not decide whether
the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116.3
Discussion
The FHFA may contract with private entities to service a loan or use an entity’s present
relationships to service a loan.4 Thus, the FHFA can authorize a loan servicer to administer the
loan.5 In other words, the FHFA could have delegated Nationstar to preserve Freddie Mac’s
property from foreclosure. This would allow Nationstar to bring claims on behalf of FHFA and its
interest in the property.
The district court may address supremacy clause issues once a case is properly before the
6
court. Neither party disputes that SFR’s quiet title claim is properly before the court. Private
parties can also argue that federal law preempts state law. 7 Thus, Nationstar can argue that the
Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116.8
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By Elise Conlin.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3116 (2015).
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D) (2012).
12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a)(8) (2013).
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
See, e.g., Munoz v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Inc., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 23, 348 P.3d 689, 690 (2015).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3116.

Conclusion
The Court held that Nationstar could have standing to assert claims on behalf of FHFA or
Freddie Mac if those two entities had an interest in the deed. Thus, the Court reversed and
remanded the case for the district court to resolve that factual dispute. The Court also remanded
for the district court to decide whether the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116 if the
court decides that Nationstar has standing.9
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